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Dreaming the Self; A unified approach towards dreams, 
subjectivity and the radical imagination. 
 
Dr. Elisabeth Kirtsoglou, University of Durham 
 
 
Unsettling dreams – for anthropologists and informants alike; Introductory 
remarks. 
 
“So, what are you writing on?” my mother asked in a despondent last attempt to 
prolong our telephone conversation –the fifth of that day- which I was, equally 
despondently, trying to put to an end. “Dreams”, I replied. “Dreams? I thought you 
were working on a publication”, she remarked. “I am working on a publication”, I 
responded –in an annoyed tone which she immediately picked up. “So, anthropology 
studies dreams as well… Interesting…”, my mother retracted and started narrating to 
me the dream she had two nights before and then another one, and another one. She 
had finally found a good excuse to prolong the conversation and address at the same 
time some of her more burning concerns like the marriage I do not seem to be getting 
on with and the fact that she is the last one of her friends and relatives not to have a 
grandchild yet as a result. Her last dream was about teeth. She narrated the dream and 
gave me her interpretation: “I dreamt that I was having a denture –how weird, as you 
know all my teeth are in place- which came out. I was so distressed, but then I cleaned 
it and put it back on again. Falling teeth means death”. In an attempt to evade the 
subject and avoid the standard grouch about how she will die “before managing to 
hold a grandchild in her arms”, I offered her an alternative interpretation: “False teeth 
is about pretention, appearances. Your dream means that you feel as though your 
public image is being threatened, but you see mum you are stronger than that. You 
just cleaned it and put it back on”. My mother did not like my innuendo at all, just as I 
began to enjoy our cryptic talk about my future and her feelings towards it. “Falling 
teeth is about death”, she insisted, “but I hope you don’t tell anyone else about my 
dreams. I don’t want people to think that I believe in dreams and nonsense”. Her brief 
concern with reason, however, was followed by the narration of yet another dream she 
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had of me in a white dress boarding an Olympic air plane at Heathrow, planned to 
land right on the roof of our house in Greece.  
 
This paper focuses on dream-experiences and dream-narratives as sites of creativity 
and agency. Through the ethnographic exploration of dreams recounted to me mainly 
by informants in Thessaloniki, Greece I will argue that dreams are means of making 
sense of the world in a relational and intersubjective manner, as well as instances of 
the human capacity to invent new forms and ‘original figurations’ (Kirtsoglou 2004: 
38; cf. also McNay 2000: 20; Braidotti 2002: 13).  
Anthropological research on dreams is definitely not a new field (see for 
example Tedlock 1987; Edgar 1995; Mageo 2003; Stewart 2004; to name but a few). 
Nevertheless, the theorization and analysis of the dream experience can be a difficult 
and awkward venture for a number of reasons. First, the anthropologist –just like her 
mother- has to face the question of ‘rationality’. Can the focus of our analysis be 
experiences of ‘dreams and nonsense’, or shall we remain in the comfortable shelter 
of a semiotic appreciation of the dream as culturally constructed text? (cf. Stewart 
1997: 878). Second, the difficulty of envisaging the dream as something more than a 
reworking of reality becomes even stronger when combined with the realization that 
we actually have no access –as anthropologists- to the dream as such (cf. Stewart 
1997: 877; Edgar 1999: 29; Crapanzano 2003; Hollan 2004: 171). We are confounded 
to working with dream-narratives and thus the synthesis of a remotely comprehensive 
socioanalytical approach of the dream-experience seems –at first sight- like climbing 
mount untenable. The indecipherability of dreams leads us directly to our third 
problem, namely their ostensible ‘private’ nature. Anthropology has traditionally 
devoted itself to the study of social phenomena. The private nature of dreams and the 
fact that are ‘generated within individual minds’ (cf. Lyon this volume, Heijnen this 
volume), poses definitely a problem. In an effort to set the scene for my subsequent 
ethnographic exploration of the power of dreams, I will try to briefly discuss these 
three problems claiming that they are interrelated and ultimately connected to an 
artificial dichotomy between dream and reality.  
 
The ontology of the sovereign human subject of modernity –an historicopolitical 
effect of the age of Enlightenement as Kant had envisaged it- has been firmly 
established in reason (cf. Foucault 1984; Kant 1784). The use of reason –as opposed 
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to subjecting oneself to authority- marked the way out of a state of ‘immaturity’, and 
into a new era of ‘adulthood’ for humanity (Foucault 1984: 37-38). The adult status of 
man (sic) depended since then, almost directly, on his willingness and ability to be 
constantly establishing the truth (by reason or science), ostracizing unmediated belief 
in the realm of ‘primitive thought’. In this context, dreams –just like various other 
forms of human experience- needed to be firmly grounded to ‘reality’ in order to be 
subjected to systematic rationalization and scientific investigation. Thus dream-time 
and the events that take place in dreams were only analysed from the perspective of 
‘awake-time’, in terms of images re-worked rather than produced de novo or actually 
existing anywhere else than in human memory (cf. Globus 1994). In our 
Enlightenment-shaped cosmology what happens during dreaming does not exist. It is 
only ‘reality’ –that is, awake time- that exists and generates dreams. To argue the 
opposite, or worse to believe in dreams as authentic experiences, seems for many a 
violation of human rationality.  
In a relatively recent introduction to a special issue on dreams, Stewart 
discusses how Victorian anthropologists evoked the “ability to distinguish purely 
mental phenomena from real perceptions” as a “prime criterion for having attained 
civilization (2004: 76). Victorian evolutionism purported that “those who believed in 
the reality of dreams lacked a theory of mind” (ibid) and therefore only “the savage 
could consider the events in his dreams to be as real as those of his waking hours” 
(Lubbock 1870/1978: 126 cited in Stewart 2004: 76). This dichotomy between 
‘reality’ and ‘dream’ that rests on a hierarchical distinction between dream-time and 
awake-time, is not only evolutionist in character, but also clearly artificial since it 
effects a peculiar compartmentalization of the nature of human beings. For, it 
presupposes a certainty that whatever it is that engenders events at awake-time is 
radically different from that which generates events at dream-time and moreover the 
latter is somehow inferior and subordinate to the former. This supposition is not only 
somewhat bizarre, but also entirely unfounded and difficult to prove by either purely 
‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ or ‘philosophical’ means. To say for instance that to invent 
in awake-time a machine that did not previously exist comes from that part of the 
brain which is capable of producing technological feats, but to dream of flying comes 
from some other part of the brain that produces deluded fantasies is illogical; 
especially if we consider that the machine invented in awake-time can be an airplane. 
In that sense, Globus is right to argue that “[t]he mechanism for producing the wake 
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world and the mechanism of the dream ought to be the very same mechanism, at least 
we should seriously consider that possibility” (1994: 25). As a consequence of the 
aforementioned observation we are compelled to accept –at least provisionally- that if 
reality shapes dreams then dreams shape reality too. Most importantly, until we 
become somehow certain that reality and dream are produced by two separate 
mechanisms, and until we somehow discover that one mechanism is superior to the 
other we are also compelled to accept that dream-time and awake-time form a 
continuum.         
 My argument in favor of a unified approach towards ‘dream’ and ‘reality’ has 
consequences for the second analytical problem of dreams delineated above as the 
asymmetry between dream experience and dream narrative. Surely, as 
anthropologists we only have access to dream narratives. In fact, our problem is not 
disciplinary in its nature; just human. No-one –not even scientists employing 
advanced technology like EEG equipment- can have direct access to dream 
experience. Someone else’s dream is effectively nothing but that person’s narrative 
story of a dream. We will never be sure whether the dream took place, or what 
happened in it, since we cannot –at least in the foreseeable future- share it ‘directly’. 
Did my mother actually dream of me in a white dress on my way to Greece, or was 
that a rhetorical device, a way of reminding cum persuading me that I should be 
getting married soon?  
In some ways our inability to share ‘directly’ a dream experience resembles 
the philosophical problem of other minds. We can never be sure about other people’s 
mental states or thoughts and yet this has not thus far prevented us from 
anthropological investigation. Truly, there is a huge difference between culture that 
‘unfolds before your eyes’ –so to speak- and the dream which does not. But at the 
same time a great deal of our understanding of any culture (often including what is 
broadly termed our own), depends on our informants’ narrative accounts. Meaning is 
often established in narrative (cf. Kirtsoglou 2010 nd; McNay 2008) both in relation 
to ‘dreams’ and with regard to ‘reality’, and therefore in this case too, the radical 
division between ‘dream’ and ‘reality’ is unfounded.  
It is not only the anthropologist who makes sense of dreams through narrative. 
The informant too –the dreamer- must sometimes narrativize the experience before 
s/he capable of making sense of it (cf. Orchs and Capps 1996: 19). It is therefore fair 
to argue that the anthropological investigation of dreams is not radically different 
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from researching other human experiences. Except for one last problem: sociality is 
shared, while dreams are not. 
 The last issue of the ‘privacy’ of dreams is too, I claim, a byproduct of the 
unfounded dichotomy between ‘reality’ and dream’. We surely dream alone, as we 
think alone, sometimes pray alone, and I too at this very moment write alone this 
paper on dreams. If however we consider dream-time and awake-time as influencing 
each other generatively in a symmetrical fashion, then we can safely argue that 
dreams cannot be casted out of human sociality. If our waking thoughts are social 
thoughts, then our sleeping thoughts are social too. And if –as anthropologists- we 
theorize on human agency and creativity based on what happens in our informants 
waking life, there is no reason why we do not pursue the same objective in relation to 
our informants’ dream-time. Our abilities to invent, create, generate, synthesize and 
institute exist while we dream as much as they exist in ‘reality’, if not more so. For, 
evidently in dreams we often engage with the impossible; sometimes in reality too.  
 
 
 
b. Phobetor
i
 - the self salvaged 
 
The ethnographic instances of dream-narrations that will be recounted in this paper 
are part of my ongoing fieldwork in Thessaloniki, Greece that started in 2007. The 
main objective of my research has been politics and more specifically the broad 
themes of globalization, anti-americanism, power, rhetoric and history. Long term 
fieldwork however, often creates extended and extensive relations with people and 
ultimately involves the discussion of themes that are seemingly irrelevant to one’s 
own research. Fieldworking is more often about shared instances of sociality than 
solely about researching one theme. In this context many of my informants shared 
with me their dreams. Some of them related to political matters and some don’t, but 
all of them were interesting and intriguing enough to be recorded in my field-diary. 
The dream that I will be considering in this section relates to times of distress and 
clearly indicates the dreamers’ attempt to negotiate and resolve anxiety, uncertainty 
and stress.  
 
 
 6 
Markos 
 
Markos is an 81 year old man of refugee origin. He currently resides in Kalamaria, a 
distinctly refugee neighborhood in Thessaloniki and he used to own a small family 
industry (viotehnia) that produced clothes. Such industries were very common in 
Greece, especially in the eighties, but Markos prided being among the oldest members 
of the profession since his mother was herself seamstress. Both Markos’s parents 
came from Asia Minor in 1922
ii
. His mother Tasia was about 15 and his father 
approximately 18 years old when they fled the burning harbor of Izmir (Smyrna) in 
Turkey. Markos’s dream is one of the many dreams narrated to me in the field that 
relate to political events. Such dreams, imbued with historicity, were often 
experienced by people who were the children of refugees or refugees themselves. It is 
also important to note though that informants of different backgrounds reported 
dreams of being refugees, an experience they never had in ‘real’ life, attesting to the 
shared character of historical narratives and the culturally-laden nature of dreams. 
Markos’s dream took place in the summer of 1974 during the invasion of the Turkish 
military forces in Northern Cyprus. At the time, all men under 40 in Greece were 
called up for compulsory enlistment, but Markos was not drafted since he was already 
44.  
 
Yes, I was not drafted, but many of my neighbors were… many people… leaving wives 
and small children behind, not knowing if they will come back. Kyra-Tasia [Markos’s 
mother] was constantly crying. ‘Don’t cry’ I was prompting her, I will not be going 
anywhere, but she would constantly remember her own experience, fleeing from the 
flames in Smyrna [Izmir] and she would cry ‘for the poor, unlucky people of Cyprus’ 
who were now in similar position. “You don’t know Markos what it is to run for your 
life”, she kept saying. I must have been really influenced by her sorrow, the events 
and the general atmosphere. I remember I had this frightening and at once peculiar 
dream. In my dream I was in the waterfront of Thessaloniki. Just in front of the White 
Tower [an Ottoman monument, originally built to fortify the city, later used as a 
prison and in modern times the emblem of the town]. Everything was quiet and 
ordinary. I was strolling on the waterfront under the shining sun. Then suddenly, out 
of nowhere there were flames, and smoke and people screaming and running from 
soldiers who were after them. They were heavily armed soldiers with modern 
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weapons and ammunition and they were coming from everywhere. I felt disoriented, 
frightened, and I started running myself. I was trying to leave the waterfront and go 
into the town thinking that I could perhaps hide in the home of my friend Yorgos that 
was relatively close to where I was at the time. Then I saw my mother. She was 
running and a soldier was after her. I tried to go to her rescue but I could not reach 
them. I tried screaming but no voice was coming out of my mouth. I kept running but 
the distance between us was becoming greater and greater and I felt incredible agony 
and despair. And then I saw a high-ranking priest but couldn’t see his face. He came 
flying from the sky, like a big, black bird with his cloth waving and he dived like a 
sea-gull, reached for my mother and snatched her from the crowd. He was much like 
an angel and I was left there watching them as they flew above my head, crying in 
relief that my mother was out of harm’s way. When I woke up I was still crying. I 
couldn’t sleep for the rest of the night, just sat there in the balcony thinking of my 
dream and the high-ranking priest whose face I couldn’t see. To my mind at the time 
it was an image inspired by Makarios [Makarios III, archbishop and president of 
Cyprus at the time]. The next day however, when I told my mother about the dream 
and the priest she shook her head. ‘You dreamt of Chrysostomos’, she told me. ‘You 
dreamt of saint Chrysostomos’ and she crossed her self. ‘May his grace help all the 
people who are now in need’ (i hari tou na voithisei olous tous anthropous pou einai 
stin anagki).  
 
By St. Chrysostomos, Markos’s mother meant Chrysostomos Kalafatis, (or 
Chrysostomos of Smyrna as he is widely known in Greece) the archbishop of Izmir in 
1922. Chrysostomos Kalafatis was lynched by the mob just prior to the great fire that 
destroyed part of the city and resulted in the dramatic exodus of its Greek inhabitants 
in the 9
th
 of September of 1922. Most refugees, and especially people who originated 
in Izmir, consider Chrysostomos Kalafatis a saint because purportedly he refused to 
leave the city the day before when the Greek army left, choosing to remain alongside 
his flock and becoming a martyr.  
 
Markos’s dream has a number of theoretically and analytically significant dimensions, 
especially in relation to the alleged privacy of dreams. We undoubtedly dream alone. 
It is nevertheless a matter of analysis and perspective whether we dream as 
‘individuals’ or as ‘persons’. I am alluding here directly to Strathern and her 
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theorization of the Melanesian person, in order to maintain that it is indeed difficult to 
insist on a “strict separation of the individual from the collective” (Stewart 1997: 877; 
cf. Kleinman and Kleinamn 1996: 189).  
As I have argued elsewhere (Kirtsoglou 2004: 38), Strathern’s concept of the 
person becomes a useful theoretical and analytical notion in our understanding of 
Greek subjectivity. The person, Strathern claims is ‘a multiply constructed agent’, 
‘composed of diverse relationships’, who acts ‘because of relationships’ and as such 
her identity is always relational (1988: 324, 57). In terms of Greek ethnography, it has 
been long pointed out that the concept of the single individual is insufficient for 
understanding and explaining Greek culture (Kirtsoglou 2004: 107; Theodossopoulos 
1997: 264; Salamone and Stanton 1986: 99; Hirschon 1989: 141; Herzfeld 1985: 11). 
If in Greece one is performing ‘on behalf of a collectivity’ (Herzfeld 1985: 11; 
Kirtsoglou 2004) in his/her awake time, there is no reason to think that in his/her 
dreamtime will experience events as a single, isolated individual.  
In his exploration of the image of the ‘field’ in Modern Greek dream 
narratives, Stewart argued in favour of a strong “continuity between the personal and 
the social, the emotional and the cognitive” showing effectively how such “putative 
dichotomies merge in human experience” (1997: 877). Likewise the dream of Markos 
recounted here attests to the inherently social and relational potential of dreams. His 
dream, ‘incorporates’ his mother’s narrative of her experiences in the great fire of 
Izmir, and is providing shape to culturally and historically formed analogies between 
the exodus from Izmir and the dislocation of populations in Cyprus. In the dream both 
these events merge representationally in the familiar setting of the waterfront in 
Thessaloniki, constituting the dream an historical narrative. Markos’s dream analogy 
is a kind of narrative shared not only between his own dream-time and awake-time, 
but between his dream-time and his mother’s awake time and ultimately between his 
dream-time and the awake-time of a number of other refugee and non-refugee 
informants who –when addressing historical and political matters- draw consistently 
analogies of a similar kind (cf Kirtsoglou and Theodossopoulos 2010; Sutton 2003).  
 The ‘illogical’ image of the high-ranking priest flying and snatching Markos’s 
mother out of harm’s way is of particular importance when one considers the act of 
‘sharing’ the dream the day after. Markos dreamt not as an individual, but as a person 
composed of relationships. Much in the same manner, his explanation of the dream 
has not been an individual venture but a shared practice. As Stewart points out, it is 
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not unusual for people in Greece to share dreams (1997: 884). These moments of 
sharing (by no means specific to Greek culture), effect a further cultural 
contextualization of the dream imagery (Edgar 1999: 28). Considering the importance 
of group work for dream interpretation, Edgar maintains that “the culturally 
constructed meaning evoked from the dream imagery… did not essentially reside 
within the dream imagery itself but was created through… the cultural 
contextualization… of the reported dream imagery (1999: 28). For Markos, sharing 
the dream with his mother meant also a shared authorship of the dream narrative. It is 
through such processes of sharing that “the idiosyncratic personal dream comes to be 
converted, through contact with public canons of interpretation into a recognizably 
standard narrative” (Stewart 1997: 885). Commenting on the dream also shapes the 
dream up to a great extent. The flying priest is finally named as being not Makarios 
(the archbishop of Cyprus), but Chrisostomos (the archbishop of Izmir), thus firmly 
establishing the dream not only in awake and shared time, but also in the histories and 
legends of Greek refugees from Izmir; or else in shared cosmologies. 
 Markos’s dream is clearly an attempt to solve a condition of anxiety and 
distress (cf. Stewart 1997) through the image of ‘flying’ and the symbol of the 
guardian angel. In ‘real’ time Markos (like others in Greece) was experiencing 
distress and anxiety at the face of the events in Cyprus and at the possibility of an 
impending Greco-Turkish war that would have no doubt changed people’s lives 
irrevocably. Ordinary men and women feel understandably powerless when 
confronted with large scale events they cannot influence or control. Similarly, Markos 
is witnessing the events in the dream from a powerless standpoint. He reports not 
being able to shout, or save either himself or his mother. His feelings of 
powerlessness in ‘real’ life acquire a visual and representational status in the dream. 
Employing historically and culturally specific shared symbols, the dream offers a 
creative resolution. The mother is salvaged and anxiety gives its place to relief 
through strengthening the connection between the world of men and that of saints (cf. 
Stewart 1991; 1997: 886). Irrespectively of the identity of the high-ranking priest, he 
is a religious entity with powers that are not ordinary to man. He is an angel, or like 
an angel, a creature of the world of the sacred. When faced with events he cannot 
control, Markos is dreaming of ‘godly’ –so to speak- entities who come to the rescue 
of his mother. ‘Real’ life might be something he cannot influence, but in his dream he 
can reduce the distance between Man, God and His saints. In Markos’s dreamworld 
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the forces of the heavens empathize with the human predicament on earth. Thus the 
lack of ‘earthly’ power is being compensated with ‘heavenly’ power. His faith in a 
safe future is being restored through an ‘illogical’ image of a flying priest, which 
nevertheless –in terms of ‘real’ life beliefs and shared symbols- makes perfect sense. 
Markos’s dream supports Barris claim that “the paradoxical logic of legitimate 
violations of sense does not only characterize dreams, but also characterizes certain 
very deep kinds of issue… the deepest, most meaningful dimensions of our sober, 
waking reality” (2010: 3).   After all, at the face of such adversities- what Markos can 
do (in dream or awake time) other than leave his future in the hands of God?  
 
 
 
c. Phantasus – the self imagined 
 
As I have argued, the anthropological exploration of dreams demonstrates the 
unbreakable continuity between the ‘personal’ and the ‘social’, between dream-time 
and awake-time. The following dream will serve as an ethnographic illustration of my 
claim that dreams are sites of agency and creativity. I will recount the dream narrative 
of Niki, a 45 year old woman who works as a high-school teacher in Thessaloniki. At 
the time of my fieldwork, Niki was married to Charis who was a doctor and lived a 
comfortable life with her two children in a detached house in Pylaia, a suburbia-like 
area of Thessaloniki. Niki is the fourth child of a relatively poor working-class family, 
while Charis is of similar background. They represent the image of the ‘self-made’ 
couple, an all too common occurrence in contemporary Greece. Niki narrated to me 
one of her important dreams in order to explain how she came to imagine herself as 
Charis’ wife long before they eventually got married.  
   
Niki 
 
When I originally met Charis in the university we were just friends. I was in a 
relationship with Nikos –you don’t know him- an engineer from a very rich family. 
Everyone was telling me how lucky I was, and that I should stay with Nikos and marry 
him and have an easy life. I could appreciate the prospect of an easy life coming from 
a non-well off and big family myself. And Nikos was a good guy. It’s not as if I didn’t 
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fancy him, or as if he was boring or a bad character or any of this. But I just didn’t 
see us together. Each time I was trying to imagine my life with Nikos I could see me in 
a nice apartment, working just for my personal realization, having a nice car, 
wearing nice clothes… having two children, a boy and a girl (I have always wanted a 
boy and a girl) who were attending a private school and  tennis lessons. All that was 
really nice but there was nowhere the image of me and Nikos, together. It was all 
about how easy and tidy life would be. And then I had this dream… It was vivid and 
symbolic; beautiful dream and crystal clear to me, despite the fact that I usually find 
most of my dreams to be nonsensical and rather convoluted. I dreamt of a garden. It 
was a gorgeous garden with flowers and orange trees. The branches of the trees were 
almost touching the ground from the weight of the fruits. I was walking in it and the 
wonderful smells were filing my body and reaching my soul. Just as I was strolling in 
the garden, it started raining but the sun was still up. The sun was shining and it was 
raining at the same time. Rain felt like a cool, pleasant shower and I was dancing 
alone thinking to myself that this must be how the garden remained so beautiful and 
the trees so full of fruit… because it rained so nicely while the sun still shone. And 
then in my dream I thought of this silly rime ‘sun and rain- the poor are getting 
married’ (ilios kai vrohi pantreuontai oi ftohoi). You know it… yes… and I thought 
instantly of Charis and I said to myself in the dream that Charis was not rich but I 
could marry him there and then in that garden and live happily with him. I woke up 
and I knew instantly that Charis could become my husband and that we could live 
well together. Do you see what I mean? Not necessarily that we would. I did not see 
the dream as an omen or a premonition that one day I would marry him. I felt that we 
could… that we could be good together despite not having money, not being 
professionally secure yet. I felt that what mattered is that I thought of him –or even of 
somebody like him if you want- in the dream. There I was in the middle of heaven, of 
all this richness and I did not think of Nikos who was my boyfriend and rich in terms 
of money. I thought of someone else and I immediately understood that I was after a 
different type of ‘affluence’, the type of affluence that fills your soul like the aroma of 
a flower; not just your pocket.  
 
Niki’s dream is especially rich in symbols of archetypal male-female relationships. 
The setting is a garden that alludes almost directly to the Garden of Eden, full of 
powerful representations of fertility, prosperity and happiness. It is the ideal setting of 
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getting married and living happily ever after, what Hollan calls a selfscape (2004: 
170). Hollan employs the term ‘selfscape’ to refer to “emotionally and imaginally 
vivid dreams that appear to reflect back to the dreamer how his or her current 
organization of self relates to various parts of itself, its body and other people and 
objects in the world” (2004: 172). The fertile trees, the wonderful smells and the 
paradoxical combination of rain and sun that brings to mind a simple (almost 
nonsensical but common) Greek rime about the marriage of the poor provide Niki the 
context and the opportunity to “develop a further emotional integration of the various 
aspects of the self” (Edgar 1999: 32). In ‘real’ life, she is in a relationship with a rich 
young man but when trying to project herself into the future she is incapable of 
imagining a ‘common’ future with him. Friends and people close to her keep 
commenting on the rich man’s affluence. Niki herself seeks some kind of affluence, 
coming from a relatively poor and large and family. However, as it turns out, she is 
more after what she understands as ‘emotional affluence’ rather than ‘material 
wealth’. A marriage with a rich person almost certainly promises her the latter, but 
evidently not the former. Her dream-time becomes a kind of ‘context’ where she can 
explain her awake-time ambivalence and a field of relations where the self is 
imagined as ‘emotionally affluent’ and not ‘simply rich’.  
Niki’s dream is an example of the dreamer’s cognitive processes that acquire 
visual form (Stewart 1997: 890; cf. also Hunt 1989: 149). Like the images of the open 
fields that Stewart explores, the garden becomes for Niki a “pictorial imagination of 
the cognitive spatialising of thought that is undertaken in actual thinking and problem 
solving”. Her garden is a dream-instance of what Castoriadis terms the instituted-
instituting imaginary. The archetypal garden of Eden with its images of fertility (and 
their association to womanhood) is an example of the instituted imaginary, of social 
significations that crystallize and solidify (Castoriadis 2007: 73). Niki’s thoughts –
triggered by the recollection of the rime- and the synthetic, idiosyncratic setting of the 
rain and the sun are an example of the power of creation, of the human ability to 
create and to form, that Castoriadis calls ‘the instituting’ social imaginary (ibid: 72). 
The actor here is not simply engaged in active problem-solving and decision-making. 
She is also ‘imagining’ her self, and actively guides (through dream) the course of her 
life, ultimately becoming what she has dreamt of. The dream as ‘selfscape’ “provides 
a current map or update of the self’s contours and affective resonances relative to its 
own body as well as to other objects and people in the world” (Hollan 2004: 170), 
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actively ‘mediating the dreamer’s sense of self and her social environment’ (ibid: 
172). The garden of Eden, ultimately created by Niki using familiar, cultural and 
social symbols of happiness, serves to position the self vis-à-vis oneself and others, to 
differentiate between types of affluence and to guide life decisions. Niki became what 
she had dreamt of; as she herself states, not because the dream was an omen of what 
was about to come, but because the dream was an opportunity to resolve the tension 
between “a self that felt and acted in the past, a self that feels and acts in the present, 
and an anticipated or hypothetical self that is projected to feel and act in some as yet 
unrealized moment” (Ochs and Capps 1996: 29; cf also Stewart 2004: 173; Havel 
1983).  
The context of dream-time, in all its paradoxical flexibility and freedom collapses 
the past, the present and the future, into one continuous time allowing desire to be 
imagined and embodied. Niki is not just envisaging her self happy and content. By 
entering this ‘fairy-tale space’ (cf. Stewart 1997) she translates happiness and 
affluence into tangible objects, smells and feelings of a cool shower under the sun. 
Her dream is then –clearly- an embodied narrative of the self imagined, a set of 
structuring-structured principles where already delineated frames produce the very 
concepts they are made of (cf. Bourdieu 1990; Kirtsoglou 2010 nd).           
 
 
 d. Morpheus – the self invented 
 
The analysis and theorization of dreams passes necessarily through the analysis and 
theorization of narrative. This is the case, not only because as anthropologists we only 
have access to dream narratives, but also and perhaps more importantly because as 
Edgar argues the “filtration of imagery into thought is an act of translation which 
begins the construction of meaning (1999: 29). The dreamer herself often makes sense 
of the experience by narrativizing it, and turning it into a relatively coherent tale. 
Most importantly though, in some ways the dream is itself a narrative, a “story that 
you tell yourself without knowing why” (ibid: 40). The ‘unfinished’, ‘unpredictable’ 
quality of dream-narratives (or dreams as narratives) substantiate the ‘non-reflexive 
side of subjectivity’, and the role of intuition and emotions in the realization of the 
self (cf. McNay 2008: 10). The ‘power of creation’ –what Castoriadis calls vis 
formandi- entails radical innovation, the ability to create, to form to imagine and to 
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invent (cf. Castoriadis 2007: 72). I feel that it is easy to accept this idea in the context 
of subject-object, where the object can be something tangible or an idea, a synthesis, a 
piece of music, a mathematical proof. Where we often have trouble of fully 
conceptualizing the power of vis formandi is the self. How can the self invent itself? 
Social constructivism –a powerful theoretical and analytical scheme in the social 
sciences- does not allow us much scope of conceptualizing such radical forms of 
creation. Inventing the self is a tempting idea that flirts intensively with the 
impossible, or at least with the improbable. The dream becomes an ideal context of 
catching a glimpse of that impossibility. The flexibility and seeming ‘irrationality’ of 
the dream, its liminality and character as a space where all rules and laws can be 
inverted allows sometimes for the self to be “invented in new, dazzling garments” 
(Edgar 1999: 39). This is a de novo kind of invention (cf. Globus 1994) and it should 
not be conflated with ex nihilo creation. Human beings are capable of inventing new 
forms and engage actively with the creation of ‘original figurations’ (cf. Kirtsoglou 
2004: 38; Braidotti 2002: 13). This process is often of unexpected and un-anticipatory 
nature, but it is always firmly established in a social and cultural field of possibilities 
(cf. Boudieu 1993; cf. also McNay 2008: 182, 185).  
The last dream that this paper will explore relates to inventing the self. The 
protagonist of this narrative, is Mihalis a man in his early forties who up until his 
thirtieth birthday worked as a chief barman in stylish night clubs in Thessaloniki and 
various islands like Mykonos, Crete and Santorini. After a dream on the night of his 
thirtieth birthday Mihalis decided to become a doctor. When I met him he had 
finished medical school and was specializing in pediatrics.  
 
 
Mihalis 
 
It all started with a dream I had the night following my 30
th
 birthday. I went to sleep 
after celebrating with my friends at about 5.30 in the morning. Being head barman 
for so many years meant that I had all sorts of friends and always a cool place at my 
disposal for such celebrations! I went to sleep and I had this dream… I saw myself in 
a hospital, dressed in white like a doctor and seeing patients… I was asking them 
about their symptoms and once they started telling me what they felt I immediately 
knew what was wrong with them. I remember thinking in the dream how easy the 
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diagnosis was. I just knew! I was giving them various pills, different colors and 
shapes and they instantly felt better. I could see the gratitude in their eyes and the 
smiles in their faces and it was so nice. Such a nice feeling! I woke up smiling and it 
was so vivid and felt so easy to achieve that I said to myself: “Mihali, that’s it. You 
are going to medical school”. I felt as if I was already a doctor. All that was left were 
a few practical details I needed to take care of. I saw myself as someone else. It hasn’t 
happened to me in real life. I never thought of becoming a doctor. To tell you the truth 
I was even a little scared of blood and stuff like that. I mean up to then. I never, ever 
thought of it before. It was completely new. Now I am a doctor and I feel just like in 
the dream: totally at home with this.  
 
Mihalis’s dream was definitely an innovative scenario that acted as a guiding force, 
directing his behavior in awake-time (Krippner 1994: 19). What is important to note 
in his narrative though is that the dream did not simply appear to have ‘inspired’ a life 
choice. In the dream, Mihalis claims that he ‘became’ a doctor. His dream acted as a 
space of subject formation. In the context of the dream he was able to invent a new 
role and a novel kind of subjectivity for himself. As I have argued above, this is not 
an ex-nihilo creation. The power of the doctor, his/her readily available knowledge 
and assumed command of the human body, the expected gratitude of the patient and 
the power relationship between the healer and the healed are representations firmly 
established in a specific socio-historical field (cf. Foucault 1975; 1976; 1980 
indicatively). What is totally new for Mihalis is the identification of the self with this 
specific, instituted field of possibilities. In the dream (as well as in the narrative that 
made sense of the dream) he was capable of exercising a radical form of imagination, 
of feeling like a doctor thereby literally in-corporating the sociocultural expectations 
and representations of the role. In this unanticipated reflexive exercise during dream-
time Mihalis made for himself a new self that was finally and ultimately realized in 
awake-time. His last sentence “Now I am a doctor and I feel just like in the dream: 
totally at home with this”, encourages us not to doubt the continuity of existence and 
to question yet again the rigidity of the dichotomy between ‘dream’ and ‘reality’. Just 
as the dream felt real, reality feels like a dream. What appears at first to be a playful 
fantasy of experimentation with the ‘metaphoric possibilities of the self’, ultimately 
effects reality to become itself a ‘meaningful metaphor’ (Edgar 1999: 39, 40). 
Narrative agency translates into tangible life choices and the ‘unconscious’ mind 
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reconciles fully with its ‘conscious’ counterpart. With it, I do not mean that the 
subject is at one with his/her consciousness (Moore 1999: 166; cf. Kirtsoglou 2004: 
37). I am rather suggesting that our moments of reflexive silence are not radically 
separated from those of reflexive awareness. The self in all its parts, multiple and 
contradicting identifications, is never in stasis (cf. Kirtsoglou 2004), and thus there is 
no definite moment when we are this and not that. Likewise, our ability to engage in 
creative action is not a feature of either solely waking life, or purely dream-time. The 
human subject is –I claim- in a continuous dialogue with the world outside and the 
world inside and is capable of reconciling the two in an instituted-instituting manner. 
Created and at once creating and creative, the subject dreams of new (and preferably 
better –whatever that may mean) worlds. His/her dreams, shaped by experience and at 
once shaping it are equally powerful across ‘times’, while sleeping or awake. In this 
sense, dreams can be seen as instances of the radical imagination, sites of human 
agency and creativity, and self-making contexts imbued with culture, historicity and 
sociality.          
 
 
Hypnos and Thanatos; Concluding remarks 
 
Hypnos (sleep) was envisaged in ancient Greek mythology as the twin brother of 
Thanatos (death). Some (mainly Freudian-inspired) psychoanalytic strands of dream 
analysis see the inherent creativity of dreams as a matter of the disintegration and 
subsequent restoration of the self (cf. Kohut 1977; Hollan 2004; Heijnen this volume). 
The idea of sleep as being akin to death, is itself a cultural symbol inspired by the 
taboo-quality of the ostensible non-sociality of sleep. Sleep is imagined as a kind of 
temporary social death, much like the modern Greek concepts of xenitia (migration in 
a foreign country) and separation (cf. Kirtsoglou 2004: 89; Danforth 1982: 33, 90-5; 
Seremetakis 1991; Panourgia 1995). Sleep as a powerful metaphor of death however 
(like xenitia and separation) cannot be conflated with the purported existence of some 
dark-side, backwater side of the human psyche (Heijnen this volume). On the 
contrary, the dream reveals itself to be a site where the psyche reunites with radical 
imagination and society (cf. Castoriadis 2007: 203-205). The generative character of 
dreams can therefore be understood fully only the context of a unified approach and 
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not on the basis of artificial (almost structuralist) dichotomies between dream and 
waking time, fantasy and reality, memory and ‘real’-time creation.  
 By exploring three different dreams, distinct but not unique of their kind, I 
argued that the radical separation of dream-time from awake time involves a counter-
intuitive compartmentalization of the social self and the social mind and forecloses 
our understanding of agency, creativity and the power of the radical imagination. 
Through the perspective of an apparent (and ethnographically substantiated) 
continuity between the social, the emotional, the cognitive and the embodied, the 
dream can be regarded as another instance of the social, creative self. As Stewart 
argues, certain strands of anthropological analysis in the past concentrated too much 
on dreams as cultural texts that disregarded the dream as experience, thereby 
subordinating the phenomenological dimension of the dream to the semiotic one and 
thus displacing it (1997: 878). This has happened as a result of the idea that we cannot 
approach directly another person’s dream-experience. We can only speak of and on 
their dream narratives. As I have argued, this ‘trouble’ is not solely a problem of 
dreams and it is in many ways quite similar to the problem of other minds. As 
anthropologists and fellow human beings in general, we rarely have direct access to 
other people’s mental states whether these people are awake or asleep. All too often 
we rely on narrative accounts of events and of people’s lives. In fact even in our 
process of making sense of another culture we need to rely on narrative exegeses 
offered by our informants. Our ethnographies are themselves narratives and indeed 
provisional ones and not final and overriding accounts of some ‘authentic’ experience. 
In particular relation to dreams, it might also be that the predicament of the 
anthropologist is shared with the informant. The dreamer often has to resort to a 
narrativized account of the dream in order to make sense of the experience. As Hollan 
argues, the dream narrated might not be the dream experienced, but “dream narratives 
are not infinitely malleable either. They are constrained by dream sensations, 
perceptions and experiences that can be very vivid and ‘real’” (2004: 180). Therefore 
it is safe to argue that for the purposes of analysis and theorization the dream narrative 
is an adequate version (or representation) of one’s original experience and equally 
open to multiple and often conflicting interpretations.  
 The fundamental and problematic distinction between what is a ‘purely 
mental’ phenomena and ‘real perceptions’ is established, as Stewart (2004) shows, in 
evolutionist thought and –as I have argued- in a displaced Enlightenment-oriented 
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belief in reason as being the exclusive privilege of the Cartesian mind. In this line of 
(rather empiricist) thought, reason is conflated with rationality and both are 
confounded as originating in some (mythical) special part of the brain which is 
somehow magically sealed from emotions and only activated during certain times 
(preferably during the day and evidently in the morning otherwise school and work 
would be probably taking place at night). Such claims make excellent cosmological 
beliefs, interesting themes of anthropological study, but not all that valuable analytical 
and theoretical tools. As I have argued, we have no grounds (scientific, philosophical 
or theoretical) to uphold such a distinction. Through the case of Markos and the 
angelic image of the high-ranking priest, I have demonstrated that even the ‘logical 
violations’ in dreams are no different from the kinds of logical violations that 
characterize our awaking reality (cf. Barris 2010). Human beings –both in dream and 
in awake time- are capable of imagining and believing all sorts of counter-intuitive 
and apparently ‘irrational’ things like the virgin birth of Jesus, the astrological impact 
of far away planets, various types of global conspiracies and the idea that Elvis is not 
dead. Some of these ‘logical inversions’ come to even materialize –given time and 
effort- and cease to appear as illogical and impossible as they seemed at first; certain 
technological advancements like space travel are good examples.     
 Dream experiences and dream narratives cannot be regarded as originating 
anywhere else but in human culture, sociality, creativity and radical imagination and 
as such they need to be analysed and theorized as shared instances and not as 
‘private’, pre-cultural or ‘a-social’ mystical encounters. For, if we decide to treat the 
dream (or any other form of human experience) as pre-cultural and a-social we also 
need to invent that respectively pre-cultural and asocial agent/being/entity (or part of 
it) who is capable of bearing that experience and such venture comes dangerously 
close to being too impossible to even dream of.  
 
****************** 
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i
 In Greek mythology dreams, the oneiroi were the children of Hypnos (sleep) and they were three: 
Morpheus , Phobetor and Phantasus. Morpheus’ name comes from the word ‘morphe’, that is form, and 
his task was to provide shape, form to dreams. Phobetor’s name comes from the word ‘phobos’, fear, 
and he was responsible for the frightening images and instances of dreams. Finally Phantasus’s name 
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comes from the verb ‘phantasio’ (to imagine) and he was believed to be the one who brings images to 
mind.     
 
ii
 For a thorough anthropological accounts of Asia-Minor refugees see Hirschon 1989. 
